Muhammad Raza Shah Pahlvi,Shah of Iran

 

 

 

          SHAH OF IRAN

 

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (26 October 1919 – 27 July 1980), also known as Mohammad Reza Shah , was the last Shah (King) of the Imperial State of Iran from 16 September 1941 until his overthrow in the Iranian Revolution on 11 February 1979. He was the second and last monarch of the House of Pahlavi. His dream of what he referred to as a "Great Civilization" in Iran led to a rapid industrial and military modernization, as well as economic and social reforms.

 

EARLY LIFE:

Born in Tehran, to Reza Khan  and his second wife, Tadj ol-Molouk, Mohammad Reza was the eldest son of Reza Khan, who later became the first Shah of the Pahlavi dynasty, and the third of his eleven children. His father, a former Brigadier-General of the Persian Cossack Brigade, was Mazandarani origin. Mohammad Reza described his father in his book Mission for My Country as "one of the most frightening men" he had ever known, depicting Reza Khan as a dominating man with a violent temper.

By the time Mohammad Reza turned 11, his father deferred to the recommendation of Abdolhossein Teymourtash, the Minister of Court, to dispatch his son to Institut Le Rosey, a Swiss boarding school, for further studies. Mohammad Reza left Iran for Switzerland on 7 September 1931. Mohammad Reza was the first Iranian prince in line for the throne to be sent abroad to attain a foreign education and remained there for the next four years before returning to obtain his high school diploma in Iran in 1936. After returning to the country, the Crown Prince was registered at the local military academy in Tehran where he remained enrolled until 1938, graduating as a Second Lieutenant. Upon graduating, Mohammad Reza was quickly promoted to the rank of captain, a rank which he kept until he became Shah. During college, the young prince was appointed Inspector of the Army and spent three years travelling across the country, examining both civil and military installations.

Mohammad Reza spoke English, French and German fluently in addition to his native language Persian.

 

Came to power:

 

In 1941 the Soviet Union and Great Britain, fearing that the shah would cooperate with Nazi Germany to rid himself of their tutelage, occupied Iran and forced Reza Shah into exile. Mohammad Reza then replaced his father on the throne on September 16, 1941.

He continued the reform policies of his father, but a contest for control of the government soon erupted between the shah and an older professional politician, the nationalistic Mohammad Mosaddeq.

During World War II, Britain and the USSR were concerned by Reza Shah's friendly relations with Germany. In 1941 the two countries invaded and occupied large areas of Iran. They forced Reza Shah to abdicate, and in the absence of a viable alternative, permitted Mohammad Reza to assume the throne. The new shah's reign began against a backdrop of social and political disarray, economic problems, and food shortages.

In 1941, British and Soviet troops occupied Iran, and the first Pahlavi shah, who they regarded with suspicion, was forced to abdicate in favor of his son, Mohammad Reza. The new shah promised to act as a constitutional monarch but often meddled in the elected government’s affairs. After a Communist plot against him was thwarted in 1949, he took on even more powers. However, in the early 1950s, the shah was eclipsed by Mohammad Mosaddeq, a zealous Iranian nationalist who convinced the Parliament to nationalize Britain’s extensive oil interests in Iran. Mohammad Reza, who maintained close relations with Britain and the United States, opposed the decision. Nevertheless, he was forced in 1951 to appoint Mosaddeq premier, and two years of tension followed.

In August 1953, Mohammad Reza attempted to dismiss

Mosaddeq, but the premier’s popular support was so great that the shah himself was forced out of Iran. A few days later, British and U.S. intelligence agents orchestrated a stunning coup d’etat against Mosaddeq, and the shah returned to take power as the sole leader of Iran. He repealed Mosaddeq’s legislation and became a close Cold War ally of the United States in the Middle East.

WHITE REVOLUTION

In 1963, the shah launched his “White Revolution,” a broad government program that included land reform, infrastructure development, voting rights for women, and the reduction of illiteracy. Although these programs were applauded by many in Iran, Islamic leaders were critical of what they saw as the westernization of Iran. Ruhollah Khomeini, a Shiite cleric, was particularly vocal in his criticism and called for the overthrow of the shah and the establishment of an Islamic state. In 1964, Khomeini was exiled and settled across the border in Iraq, where he sent radio messages to incite his supporters.

The shah saw himself foremost as a Persian king and in 1971 held an extravagant celebration of the 2,500th anniversary of the preIslamic Persian monarchy. In 1976, he formally replaced the Islamic calendar with a Persian calendar. Religious discontent grew, and the shah became more repressive, using his brutal secret police force to suppress opposition. This alienated students and intellectuals in Iran, and support for Khomeini grew. Discontent was also rampant in the poor and middle classes, who felt that the economic developments of the White Revolution had only benefited the ruling elite. In 1978, anti-shah demonstrations broke out in Iran’s major cities.

On September 8, 1978, the shah’s security force fired on a large group of demonstrators, killing hundreds and wounding thousands. Two months later, thousands took to the streets of Tehran, rioting and destroying symbols of westernization, such as banks and liquor stores. Khomeini called for the shah’s immediate overthrow, and on December 11 a group of soldiers mutinied and attacked the shah’s security officers. With that, his regime collapsed and the shah fled.

The White Revolution solidified domestic support for the shah, but he faced continuing political criticism from those who felt that the reforms did not move fast enough and religious criticism from those who believed Westernization to be banned in Islam.Many Shia leaders criticized the White

Revolution, holding that liberalization laws concerning women were against Islamic values.In 1976, he formally replaced the Islamic calendar with a Persian calendar. Religious discontent grew, this alienated students and intellectuals in Iran, and support for Khomeini grew.  

Iranian Revolution 

1978–79

With a swiftly expanding economy and a rapidly modernizing infrastructure, everything was going well in Iran. But in little more than a generation, Iran had changed from a traditional, conservative, and rural society to one that was industrial, modern, and urban. The Iranian Revolution, also known as the Islamic Revolution. The Iranian revolution of 1979 saw a mass movement of diverse interests and political groups within Iranian society come together to overthrow the Shah. This would eventually lead to the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in April 1979 and the creation of a new constitution that December. However, the movement to depose the Shah and the movement driving the construction of a new political system in Iran constituted two separate movements. As Moghadam argues, ‘Iran had two revolutions…the populist revolution the Islamic revolution’. In this essay, I will focus on the ‘populist revolution’ and the extent to which it can be labeled Islamic. This focus on the first revolution is important, as its nature is contested. In contrast, the second revolution was undeniably Islamic: the successful referendum on the establishment of the Islamic Republic, the creation of an Islamic constitution and the enshrinement of Ayatollah Khomeini as Supreme Leader of Iran all support this notion. Thus, my essay will consider to what extent we can label the ‘populist revolution’ as Islamic. It will be argued that it is appropriate to use this label, as the revolution utilized the narrative and organizational structure of Shi’a Islam to build a mass movement powerful enough to overthrow the Shah. However, the socioeconomic conditions and existing political movements which fostered a climate of change were secular in nature. Therefore, it is appropriate to label the Iranian revolution of 1979 as Islamic, yet we must recognize that it originated from secular demands. This essay will demonstrate the above argument by examining Iran’s history of protest, considering the economic and political context of the 1979 revolution and evaluating the role that Ali Shariati’s actions and ideas had on the revolution. The final section will examine the role that Shi’a Islam played in the revolution, focusing on the symbolic power of Karbala.

Iran in the 20^th Century: Revolution and Reform

To demonstrate the extent to which the Iranian revolution was Islamic, it is necessary to situate the 1979 revolution within Iran’s long history of protest. This section will show that the Iranian revolution was Islamic, due to the role played by the Shi’a clergy in supporting the revolution. In contrast, previous uprisings have failed because the clergy either opposed calls for change or remained neutral in such situations. To survey the history of Iran from its foundation to the present day would be an overwhelming task to undertake, with Axworthy writing that ‘Iranian history can be seen as a microcosm of human history as a whole: empires, invasions, revolutions’. Thus, I will focus on Iran’s revolutionary history and examine whether the protests that preceded the 1979 revolution can be considered Islamic and what this tells us about the events in 1979.

Economic and Political Contexts of the Iranian Revolution

The first section of this essay demonstrated the importance of religious support in the 1979 revolution, particularly in comparison to the failed White Revolution of 1963. This section will show, however, that the 1979 revolution was not initially an Islamic revolution. It is important to note the economic and political factors that drove the Iranian people to revolt, as well as the many secular groups who played an influential role in securing the success of the revolution. This is crucial in understanding the nuanced nature of the 1979 revolution and why it cannot be oversimplified as only an Islamic revolution. Although the events of 1979 became an Islamic revolution, they were initially concerned with economic and political change as represented by secular groups.

The Iranian revolution of 1979 came about as a direct consequence of the Shah’s failed White Revolution of 1963. The White Revolution had created a great deal of economic uncertainty within the country, whilst the Shah’s increased use of SAVAK to quash political dissent left the Iranian people without a voice. Indeed, Amineh and Eisenstadt argue that the White Revolution satisfied no section of Iranian society and angered a majority of the population instead. This notion is also supported by the protests of 1963, which made both Khomeini’s name famous and indicated early discontent with the Shah’s reforms. In addition, further protests occurred in 1975 which, although unsuccessful, forced the Shah to show his authoritarian tendencies in action. These demonstrations were mirrored three years later, in protests that sparked the Iranian Revolution .The protests in 1963 and 1975 were composed of both religious and secular actors and are recognized as such. The 1979 revolution likewise consisted of diverse factions yet is considered ‘Islamic’. The next section considers why this is the case.

The Iranian revolution of 1979 is inextricably linked with the figure of Ayatollah Khomeini. Yet, “the revolution was begun by secular progressive forces with the goals of democracy and political freedoms, social justice, and independence”. So, one must consider how the Iranian revolution came to be known as the Islamic revolution. This is partially because some scholars fail to differentiate between the removal of the Shah and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran as two separate events; as Moghadam labels them, the ‘populist’ and ‘Islamic’ revolutions, respectively. The same scholars also tend to associate the Iranian revolution with the Islamisation of Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. Yet, the perception of the 1979 revolution as Islamic is not solely the fault of selective historiography. Rather, the death of the Iranian left’s leading figure before the revolution began, and the disunity of the left during the revolution, meant that the left came to be overshadowed by Khomeini. To demonstrate the role of secular forces in the Iranian revolution it is crucial to consider first, the factionalism of the Iranian left, and secondly, the role and legacy of Ali Shariati.

Death of shah:

On July 27, 1980, the former Shah of Iran died of cancer while in exile in Cairo, 17 months after being driven out by his country's Islamic Revolution. Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, his last remaining ally, laid on a state funeral for the former monarch.

Conclusion

This essay has demonstrated that the Iranian revolution of 1979 can be appropriately labeled as Islamic. Although the demands and unrest that initiated the revolution were political and economic, the Iranian ulema used its position of influence to co-opt the revolution and translate political and economic demands into religious symbolism. The eventual leadership of the revolution was Islamic, due to the institutional power of the ulema and the repression that other organizations had faced. The example of Ali Shariati shows both why the left failed and how the left could have succeeded if it had not been harshly repressed. With the loss of Shariati and the failure of the left, the Iranian ulema represented the only available option for a population which desired revolutionary change. The organisational power of the ulema combined with the rebellious symbolism of Shi’a Islam, particularly the use of the Karbala paradigm, ensured the Islamic nature of an originally secular revolution.

       

 

 

References:

•       Abedi, M. 1986. “Ali Shariati: The Architect of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran”. Iranian Studies. Volume 19, No. 3. pp. 229234.

•       Abrahamian, E. 1979. “The Causes of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran”. International Journal of Middle East Studies. Volume 10, Issue 1. pp. 381-414.

•       Moazami, B. 2009. “The Islamization of the Social Movements and the Revolution, 1963-1979”. Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Volume 29, No. 1. pp. 47-62.

•       Moshiri, F. 1991. “Iran: Islamic Revolution Against Westernization” Goldstone, J. A., Gurr, T. R. and Moshiri, F. Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century. Westview Press: Boulder, CO. pp. 116-135.

•       Rahnema, S. 2011. “Retreat and Return of the Secular in Iran”. Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Volume 31, No. 1. pp. 34-45.

•       Skocpol, T. 1982. “Rentier State and Shi’a Islam in the Iranian Revolution”. Theory and Society. Volume 11, No. 3. pp. 265-283.